Russo-Georgian conflict

[johnalexis]

Originally Posted by akritas

Mr. Bush, Enough!!

Listening to you, your Vice President, Condi Rice and US and western officials complain about "regime change," "invasion," "bloodshed" and "suffering civilians" (in the light of their crimes across the world) have become nothing but laughable at best and highly infuriating and enraging at worst.

You are an idiot!

We seem to recall that when your Israeli friends were absolutely devastating the people of Lebanon, wantonly killing civilians, destroying their country’s infrastructure and destroying their environment also….the flapping jaw of your representative, Condoleezza Rice and your entire administration were saying no ceasefire, no nothing, just keep on going, keep on committing acts of state terrorism on innocent people, keep on committing your war crimes, you have them covered.

Well, Mr. Bush, this is it. Moscow better get this one right: No limited engagement nonsense. Moscow has the moral and legal right to carry out full scale military operations within Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia to ensure the safety of its citizens, to ensure the protection of Abkhazians and Ossetians and to finally destroy NATO plans for the Caucasus region.
No sane, informed, honest, rational person can blame Russia for reacting to a genocide against their own citizens in Georgia. But then you are NONE of those things.

The problem is not what Russia is doing, but how the US is reacting to it. If you were sane, if you were informed, if you were honest, if you were rational, if you were even marginally fair, you should be happy to see Russian forces put an end to the killing of Russian citizens by the Georgian military. But no, your government is advised by lunatics who belong in psychiatric wards instead of the Pentagon and White House. And you, Mr. Bush, belong in an international criminal court to be judged for your crimes against peace and your crimes against humanity.

Lisa KARPOVA
PRAVDA.Ru

Bravo, Bravo!!!

Listening to these hypocrites on the news is enough to make you either cry, laugh or vomit, according to your character.

Idiots. They still think the world is as naive as it was in the past.

I thank God daily for the Internet.

Long may it remain free.

[Truth Bearer]

We hope..............................

[johnalexis]

Originally Posted by Grace

Albanians make 90-95% and are 2 million of a historically separate province (going back to 1200 when Serb occupied it is a stretch; durign Turkish times it was separate as well.) All other major groups left Serbs and even most Serbs agree that Albanians have been horrible treated. So you may use it as an excuse, but it's not a valid one. A village, or 50,000 people cannot claim "independence."
There are another 100,000 Albanians right next to Kosovo but in Serbia and they're staying there. (See Presevo Valley) so it's not every tiny group. Serbs tried to kill and expel the Kosova Albanians and they got independence.



US cannot sacrifice Kosova; One, it would be appeasing Russia and saying that if you use force again, we'll yield on other issues too. Second, 43 nations have said yes. Changing their position is not as easy as saying "no" now. Third, Serbia cannot take Kosova even if US leaves and no one can order Albanians to accept Serbian rule. Albanians are armed and eventually even Albania would have to open it's Enver Hoxha depots and hand artillery to Kosova. Serbs are great at killing civilians and using rape to terrorize but they suck when they meet well armed people, apparently it's in their genes (they surrendered in 1389 too).

You should read this about Albanians and get rid of the old thinking, get used to the new reality http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/minor...lbania-part-2/

Perhaps you should also do a bit of research yourself and you might discover the different ways the Albanians got rid of the Serbs in the area.

Did you know that German soldiers had to protect the Serbs in Kosovo during WWII because the Albanians were slaughtering them. This happened in no other country that the Germans occupied. The Albanians saw their chance - they were allies of the GErmans - and seized it.

"In Kosovo, under Albanian and German rule nearly 100,000 Albanians moved into Kosovo. Serbs were harassed and attacked by the occupying force of Albanians."

http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html

Someone who aspires to teach others should first of all have knowledge of the subject themselves.

[Vasco]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiWKoruqyfg " title="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiWKoruqyfg" target="_blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiWKoruqyfg

Eduard Ševarnadze, frm. Soviet Foreign Minister and ex-President of Georgia, interviewed by "Russia Today".There seems to be a certain balance within him, competence to make judgments, rather than to be an unconditional advocate of one side, although he would not say anything alike if he was in Sakašvili's shoes right now.

[Vasco]

Blowback From Bear-Baiting
by Patrick J. Buchanan (more by this author)
Posted 08/15/2008 ET


Mikheil Saakashvili's decision to use the opening of the Olympic Games to cover Georgia's invasion of its breakaway province of South Ossetia must rank in stupidity with Gamal Abdel-Nasser's decision to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships.

Nasser's blunder cost him the Sinai in the Six-Day War. Saakashvili's blunder probably means permanent loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

After shelling and attacking what he claims is his own country, killing scores of his own Ossetian citizens and sending tens of thousands fleeing into Russia, Saakashvili's army was whipped back into Georgia in 48 hours.

Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to kick the Georgian army out of Abkhazia, as well, to bomb Tbilisi and to seize Gori, birthplace of Stalin.

Reveling in his status as an intimate of George Bush, Dick Cheney and John McCain, and America's lone democratic ally in the Caucasus, Saakashvili thought he could get away with a lightning coup and present the world with a fait accompli.

Mikheil did not reckon on the rage or resolve of the Bear.

American charges of Russian aggression ring hollow. Georgia started this fight -- Russia finished it. People who start wars don't get to decide how and when they end.

Russia's response was "disproportionate" and "brutal," wailed Bush.

True. But did we not authorize Israel to bomb Lebanon for 35 days in response to a border skirmish where several Israel soldiers were killed and two captured? Was that not many times more "disproportionate"?

Russia has invaded a sovereign country, railed Bush. But did not the United States bomb Serbia for 78 days and invade to force it to surrender a province, Kosovo, to which Serbia had a far greater historic claim than Georgia had to Abkhazia or South Ossetia, both of which prefer Moscow to Tbilisi?

Is not Western hypocrisy astonishing?

When the Soviet Union broke into 15 nations, we celebrated. When Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Kosovo broke from Serbia, we rejoiced. Why, then, the indignation when two provinces, whose peoples are ethnically separate from Georgians and who fought for their independence, should succeed in breaking away?

Are secessions and the dissolution of nations laudable only when they advance the agenda of the neocons, many of who viscerally detest Russia?

That Putin took the occasion of Saakashvili's provocative and stupid stunt to administer an extra dose of punishment is undeniable. But is not Russian anger understandable? For years the West has rubbed Russia's nose in her Cold War defeat and treated her like Weimar Germany.

When Moscow pulled the Red Army out of Europe, closed its bases in Cuba, dissolved the evil empire, let the Soviet Union break up into 15 states, and sought friendship and alliance with the United States, what did we do?

American carpetbaggers colluded with Muscovite Scalawags to loot the Russian nation. Breaking a pledge to Mikhail Gorbachev, we moved our military alliance into Eastern Europe, then onto Russia's doorstep. Six Warsaw Pact nations and three former republics of the Soviet Union are now NATO members.

Bush, Cheney and McCain have pushed to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. This would require the United States to go to war with Russia over Stalin's birthplace and who has sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula and Sebastopol, traditional home of Russia's Black Sea fleet.

When did these become U.S. vital interests, justifying war with Russia?

The United States unilaterally abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty because our technology was superior, then planned to site anti-missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic to defend against Iranian missiles, though Iran has no ICBMs and no atomic bombs. A Russian counter-offer to have us together put an anti-missile system in Azerbaijan was rejected out of hand.

We built a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey to cut Russia out. Then we helped dump over regimes friendly to Moscow with democratic "revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia, and tried to repeat it in Belarus.

Americans have many fine qualities. A capacity to see ourselves as others see us is not high among them.

Imagine a world that never knew Ronald Reagan, where Europe had opted out of the Cold War after Moscow installed those SS-20 missiles east of the Elbe. And Europe had abandoned NATO, told us to go home and become subservient to Moscow.

How would we have reacted if Moscow had brought Western Europe into the Warsaw Pact, established bases in Mexico and Panama, put missile defense radars and rockets in Cuba, and joined with China to build pipelines to transfer Mexican and Venezuelan oil to Pacific ports for shipment to Asia? And cut us out? If there were Russian and Chinese advisers training Latin American armies, the way we are in the former Soviet republics, how would we react? Would we look with bemusement on such Russian behavior?

For a decade, some of us have warned about the folly of getting into Russia's space and getting into Russia's face. The chickens of democratic imperialism have now come home to roost -- in Tbilisi.

[Grace]

Originally Posted by johnalexis

Perhaps you should also do a bit of research yourself and you might discover the different ways the Albanians got rid of the Serbs in the area.

Did you know that German soldiers had to protect the Serbs in Kosovo during WWII because the Albanians were slaughtering them. This happened in no other country that the Germans occupied. The Albanians saw their chance - they were allies of the GErmans - and seized it.

"In Kosovo, under Albanian and German rule nearly 100,000 Albanians moved into Kosovo. Serbs were harassed and attacked by the occupying force of Albanians."

http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html

Someone who aspires to teach others should first of all have knowledge of the subject themselves.

actually I have plenty of research. Time for you to do the same.

"In Kosovo, under Albanian and German rule nearly 100,000 Albanians moved into Kosovo. Serbs were harassed and attacked by the occupying force of Albanians."

Find me another reputable link (no ich as last name) that says that. 100,000 Albanians people moving there it's major, and it should have left plenty of articles. The guy who wrote this is a biochemist and his articles are about "Jihad."

The colonizers that took Albanian land were thrown out when the Serbia military machine wasn't there to crush the Albanians.

Start here: http://www.trepca.net/english/2006/t...m_in_1937.html

The Albanians cannot be dispelled by means of gradual colonization alone. They are the only people who, over the last millennium, managed not only to resist the nucleus of our state, Rashka and Zeta, but also to harm us by pushing our ethnic borders northwards and eastwards. When in the last millennium our ethnic borders were shifted up to Subotica in the north and to the Kupa River in the northwest, the Albanians drove us out of the Shkodra (Scutari) region, out of the former capital of Bodin, and out of Metohija and Kosovo.

The only way and only means to cope with them is through the brute force of an organized state, in which we have always been superior to them. If since 1912 we have had no success in the struggle against them, we have only ourselves to blame since we have not used this force as we should have. There is no possibility for us to assimilate the Albanians. On the contrary, because their roots are in Albania, their national awareness has been awakened, and if we do not settle the score with them once and for all, within 20-30 years we shall have to cope with a terrible irredentism, the signs of which are already apparent and will inevitably put all our southern territories in jeopardy.

and this:
"The Serbs’ attempt to subdue Kosovo’s Albanians between 1912
and 1919 resulted in a wave of Albanian militancy and protracted lowintensity
conflict that ebbed and flowed throughout the 20th century. The
early violence reached a peak in the winter of 1918-1919, when the Serbian
army rampaged through several villages of western Kosovo, laying waste to
more than 900 houses and killing hundreds of civilians (Banac 1984: 298).

The military campaigns in Kosovo were augmented and followed by
elaborate attempts at colonization, which together advanced the official
Serbian policy of assimilating or expelling Kosovo’s Albanians (Banac
1984:298). Far from keeping such dark intentions secret, Serbian officials
and intellectuals went on the public record often and at length to articulate
the state’s desire to alienate its Albanian minority (Malcolm 1999: 268, 280,
283; Banac 1984: 298). An official Serbian report on the agrarian reform of
the mid-1930s states plainly that the policy of limiting Albanian landholdings
was aimed at reducing their demographic presence: “This [maximum
Albanian land parcel] is below the minimum needed for survival. But that
was precisely what we wanted; that is, to prevent them from living and
thereby force them to emigrate” (Banac 1984: 301).

The architects of colonization wrote detailed memoirs of their efforts at anti-Albanian
demographic engineering (Vickers 1998: 107, 116),13 and two official
decrees on colonization stand as eminent subjects of the public record.14
In all, Serbia attempted two, arguably three, colonization programs
in Kosovo between 1912 and 1999. The first, which spanned the years from
1918 to 1928 (105), achieved mixed success from Belgrade’s perspective.
Tax and property incentives for Serbs to move to Kosovo produced a
measurable demographic change in Kosovo’s cities by 1929, but the
province’s overall ethnic balance remained roughly 60% Albanian, 35%
Serb. Vasa Čubrilović, the architect the second Kosovo colonization
program, concluded from the first program’s shortfalls that a passive
schedule of incentives for Serbs and disincentives for Albanians was not
sufficient to effect the desired shift in demographics. Serbia’s new objective
would be the active, organized “mass emigration” of Albanians from Kosovo
(Malcolm 1999: 284).

During the second program, from 1929 to 1941,
Belgrade pursued twin policies of “Turkifying” its Albanian citizens through
language education and encouraging their mass transfer to what was defined
as their “natural” homeland, Turkey. Although the plan fell well short of its
targets, the 1935 Belgrade-Istanbul agreement to transfer 200,000 Albanians
is a lasting testament to its ambitious nationalist goals. The FRY
government’s Yugoslav Program on Kosovo, which lasted from 1990 until
Serbia’s pullout in 1999, arguably constituted a third colonization effort,
although unlike its predecessors, it was not named as such by official decree.
Under the Yugoslav Program’s terms, Serbs were given new apartments and
tax benefits and unduly compensated for administrative jobs in Kosovo. The
Milošević “crisis administration” of the 1990s eased this effort along by
summarily relieving several thousand Albanians of jobs subsequently filled
by Serbs (Vickers 1998: 245)."

http://www.seep.ceu.hu/archives/issue61/herbert.pdf These are real sources, by scholars, not internet self-publishers. Serbs admit colonization as well. So during WWII Albanians got their land back and setlers were sent packing. There was no way one could move 100,000 Albanians from Albania to Kosova without a major paper trail. That would have been 10% of Albania and 20% of Kosova.

FYI: many more Serbs fought for Germans than Albanians.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZBOR
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosta_Pe%C4%87anac
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbian_Volunteer_Corps

and the one that Serbs brag about, Draza Mihailovich.

How does it feels to fall for stupid Serbian propaganda and even make fun of others when you fall for it?

[Makedonia25]

YouTube - Russian withdrawal under way 08/22/08 " title="YouTube - Russian withdrawal under way 08/22/08" target="_blank">YouTube - Russian withdrawal under way 08/22/08

[Grace]

Originally Posted by Makedonia25

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rkuviqis-_M

Russians are keeping the port, buffer zones and NATO is moving ships there to deliver "aid"

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/w...blacksea-.html

NATO said a group of one Spanish, one German and one Polish ship entered the Black Sea on Thursday and was to be joined by a U.S. frigate.

It's not over yet.

[Makedonia25]

Originally Posted by Grace

Russians are keeping the port, buffer zones and NATO is moving ships there to deliver "aid"

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/w...blacksea-.html

NATO said a group of one Spanish, one German and one Polish ship entered the Black Sea on Thursday and was to be joined by a U.S. frigate.

It's not over yet.

Of course not.. As it shouldn't be

[Cadmus]

Originally Posted by Grace

There is, but they ('new' Serbs) realize that the West has won and aligning with Russia now is a loser. Their best is to have Russia on their side and the west as well (Like Greece; we all know you love Russia).



I think they did, but they should have known better. Russia poured very few troops and the Georgians virtually surrendered. Maybe it was to avoid total destruction from Russia, once they realized that they were on their own. Memo to small countries: buy Javelins, stinger missiles, sniper riffles and plan to head for the hills. Viva guerilla war and hope that a large partner comes eventually.



Russia will not be let anywhere near the Balkans. That much all Western powers agree on. Look at the map, Serbia is an island, and Russia now has the same population as Japan, not the 300 million it once had. Economy wise: it's a joke compared to the many other real powers. Basically Russia is not a superpower, nukes oil prices nonwithstanding.

FYI: Kosova was ruled by the Bulgars and Byzantines till 1180 and by the Ottomans from 1389 to 1912 so "Kosovo was always Serbia" or "our craddle" is one giant Serbian lie. History wise, it's important because Lazar surrendered there, and that's all.

By 1912, 75+% were Albanians. If Serbs say Albanians "moved there in the 17th century," even if Serbs didn't throw us of Kosovo in 12th century (read Dusan's code; he specifically mentions how to keep Albanians and Vlachs out), we moved there like the Serbs did into Vojvodina, Croatia, Bosnia etc. with the ruler's permission.

re Kosovo: Russia is using the same language but even Serbs will tell you that what Milosevic did in 1998-99 and what Serbs did from 1912 till 1999 is a disgrace and much much worst that what Georgia did to Ossetians. Also, Kosova is not a city or 15,000 people, they are 2 million of them.

If any state does this (see below) to their minorities, they should no longer be able to rule them. Serbs are upset that their ethnic cleansing backfired and now Albanians surpass them in the Balkans, at least in young people. US and EU is keeping Russia away and Serbs are stuck. What Russia gave them, they lost it and now all their neighbors are armed and Serbia does not dare start another war.



Who Deserves Kosovo? An Argument from Social Contract Theory

...

The Possibility of Repair: An Empirical Assessment
The modern history of Belgrade’s rule in Kosovo is grim. Its
twentieth-century span is book-ended by extended episodes of official violent
repression, from 1912 to 1919 and from 1998 to 1999; marked by elaborate
colonization programs aimed at restoring the Serbs’ medieval majority status;
and institutionalized by a series of flawed constitutions that implicitly
identified Kosovo’s majority as second class citizens. Serbia founded its
modern state on a decision to treat its Albanian community as more worthy
of alienation than integration. Belgrade’s governance of Kosovo from 1912
to 1999 and its current Kosovo policies show in both word and deed that it
has not, up to the present day, reversed this basic decision.
Serbian forces occupied the territory of Kosovo in 1912, burning
Albanian villages from the Kosovo border to Pristina (Malcolm 1999: 251)
and failing to notice, as Banac (1984: 292) has drolly put it, that there were
hardly any Serbs left in the land they called “Old Serbia.” The liberation was
actually a horrific military occupation, (296) in which the Serbian army
punished Kosovo’s Albanians for having sided with the Ottomans (Vickers
1998: 78). The Serbs’ attempt to subdue Kosovo’s Albanians between 1912
and 1919 resulted in a wave of Albanian militancy and protracted low intensity
conflict that ebbed and flowed throughout the 20th century. The
early violence reached a peak in the winter of 1918-1919, when the Serbian
army rampaged through several villages of western Kosovo, laying waste to
more than 900 houses and killing hundreds of civilians (Banac 1984: 298).

The military campaigns in Kosovo were augmented and followed by
elaborate attempts at colonization, which together advanced the official
Serbian policy of assimilating or expelling Kosovo’s Albanians (Banac
1984:298). Far from keeping such dark intentions secret, Serbian officials
and intellectuals went on the public record often and at length to articulate
the state’s desire to alienate its Albanian minority (Malcolm 1999: 268, 280,
283; Banac 1984: 298). An official Serbian report on the agrarian reform of
the mid-1930s states plainly that the policy of limiting Albanian landholdings
was aimed at reducing their demographic presence: “This [maximum
Albanian land parcel] is below the minimum needed for survival. But that
was precisely what we wanted; that is, to prevent them from living and
thereby force them to emigrate” (Banac 1984: 301).

The architects of colonization wrote detailed memoirs of their efforts at anti-Albanian
demographic engineering (Vickers 1998: 107, 116),13 and two official
decrees on colonization stand as eminent subjects of the public record.14
In all, Serbia attempted two, arguably three, colonization programs
in Kosovo between 1912 and 1999. The first, which spanned the years from
1918 to 1928 (105), achieved mixed success from Belgrade’s perspective.
Tax and property incentives for Serbs to move to Kosovo produced a
measurable demographic change in Kosovo’s cities by 1929, but the
province’s overall ethnic balance remained roughly 60% Albanian, 35%
Serb. Vasa Cubrilovic, the architect the second Kosovo colonization
program, concluded from the first program’s shortfalls that a passive
schedule of incentives for Serbs and disincentives for Albanians was not
sufficient to effect the desired shift in demographics.

Serbia’s new objective
would be the active, organized “mass emigration” of Albanians from Kosovo
(Malcolm 1999: 284). During the second program, from 1929 to 1941,
Belgrade pursued twin policies of “Turkifying” its Albanian citizens through
language education and encouraging their mass transfer to what was defined
as their “natural” homeland, Turkey. Although the plan fell well short of its
targets, the 1935 Belgrade-Istanbul agreement to transfer 200,000 Albanians
is a lasting testament to its ambitious nationalist goals.

The FRY
government’s Yugoslav Program on Kosovo, which lasted from 1990 until
Serbia’s pullout in 1999, arguably constituted a third colonization effort,
although unlike its predecessors, it was not named as such by official decree.
Under the Yugoslav Program’s terms, Serbs were given new apartments and
tax benefits and unduly compensated for administrative jobs in Kosovo. The
Miloševic “crisis administration” of the 1990s eased this effort along by
summarily relieving several thousand Albanians of jobs subsequently filled
by Serbs (Vickers 1998: 245).
The Albanians’ constitutional status under socialist Yugoslavia
formalized their truncated relationship with the state. The arcane Titoist
system of ethno-civic terminology encoded ethnic communities with rights
and liberties derived from their “rightful” homes of origin. Nations had their
proper guardians of benefits in their respective Yugoslav republics. The
Serbs had Serbia, the Croats had Croatia, and so forth.

In principle, the republics reserved the right to secede from the Yugoslav federation, as
constituent units of a federated state. However, those members of
nationalities who had homelands outside Yugoslavia’s borders were
effectively denied the right to self-determination and a full schedule of other
civic benefits. As a nationality under the Titoist system, the Albanians were
implicitly defined as second-class citizens. Their nation-state and, by
implication, their “natural homeland,” was Albania. Farcically, this implied
that Tirana was the proper guarantor of the Yugoslav Albanians’ most basic
rights and liberties, despite the glaring political reality that Albania’s
sovereignty did not extend to its co-nationals in Yugoslavia. An Albanian’s
choice to remain in Yugoslavia was implicitly a choice to accept second class
citizenship or emigrate. Or, in Paijic’s terms, it was an acceptance of one’s
status as a “historic guest,” invited to remain, but only at the pleasure of
Yugoslavia’s “hosts,” the nations (Mertus 1999: 288).

The Albanians’ poor record of integration within a state purportedly
guided by “brotherhood and unity” eventually shamed the Tito government,
for a short while, into improving the Albanians’ situation. In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, Tito made a handful of upgrades to the civil status of
Yugoslavia’s Albanians’, lightening the repressive police presence in Kosovo
and allowing the unrestricted printing of Albanian-language books. These
measures stimulated greater self-assertion within the Albanian community,
but ultimately only served to mitigate the marginal effects of the Yugoslav
state’s decision to withhold a full social contract from its citizens. They did
not reverse the state’s fundamental decision to treat its Albanian community
as more worthy of alienation than integration.
The Albanians’ share of state-protected rights and liberties reached
its high-water mark with the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, attaining all the
attributes of full citizenship, but without delivering a fundamental change in
their status of nationality. The initial Serbian objections to the 1974
constitution and the developments of the 1980s and 1990s in Kosovo were to
show how fleeting first-class civil rights could be if bestowed ad hoc on
second-class citizens, against the wishes of the state’s first-class citizens and political elite.

After Tito’s death in 1980, the Yugoslav political system in general,
and the SFRY presidency in particular, drifted into a “pattern of inertia”
(Crnobrnja 1994: 83). Despite the apparent calm, the country was
approaching the boiling point of ethnic separatism and economic collapse,
but the country’s politicians, eager to maintain the fiction that Tito’s death
had not left a leadership vacuum, were determined to gloss over the factors
of instability. “Nobody wanted to rock the boat,” according to Crnobrnja
(82). In March of 1981 Kosovo’s Albanians presented the first serious
challenge to the uneasy stability of post-Tito Yugoslavia. Two thousand
students demonstrated over poor living conditions at Pristina University,
provoking hundreds of arrests and touching off a series of large, violent
demonstrations throughout Kosovo. The demonstrations quickly took on the
most political of dimensions. Kosovo’s Albanians demanded republican
status and with it, the right to self-determination.

In response to the riots, Belgrade began incrementally to reverse
Tito’s Albanian-friendly policies. The Serbian and Yugoslav governments
steadily removed the legal guarantees of Kosovo’s limited autonomy,
eventually annulling significant portions of the 1974 constitution. In response
to Serbian agitation in Kosovo (largely orchestrated by Miloševic), Belgrade
imposed an emergency administration in 1990, which deprived the
province’s Albanians of numerous common rights and liberties. The Serbian
emergency administration peremptorily halted broadcast media in the
Albanian language (Vickers 1998: 245), fired senior editors of the Albanian
daily Rilindja, and replaced over 1,000 Albanian media-sector staff with
Serbs (246). Albanian medical staff, school teachers, and university
professors were also fired en masse and replaced by Serbs. Security forces
squelched the right to public assembly, disregarding the distinction between
peaceful and violent gatherings (224, 242). The state’s summary use of
administrative, legal and coercive power against the Albanian community
amounted to the deliberate oppression of its own citizens.
The FRY’s and Serbia’s use of indiscriminate violent force on their
own citizens in the late 1990s demonstrated a decisive commitment to the
policy of alienating Serbia’s Albanian community. When fighting began to
escalate in 1998 between the nascent Kosovo Liberation Army and the FRY
and Serbian security forces, Belgrade resumed the repressive methods by
which it conducted the 1912 liberation of Kosovo, the 1918 reoccupation,
and the 1946 suppression of the Drenica Valley—applying indiscriminate
military force to targets of questionable validity, including whole villages of
non-combatants.15 Far from observing the military principles of
proportionality and precision necessary to subdue an insurgent force, FRY
and Serbian forces attacked and killed Serbia’s own citizens indiscriminately
and in large numbers.16 The 1998-1999 counter-insurgency campaign
constituted a gross, deliberate violation of the state’s obligation to apply the
highest diligence to its use of coercive force against its own citizens. Despite
the overwhelming record of evidence to this effect, the current Government
of Serbia, and many commentators in Belgrade, hold dramatically different
opinions regarding the current situation in Kosovo.

Belgrade’s own understanding of the Kosovo narrative since 1999
casts serious doubt on its ability to adjust policy. To hear the Serb side of the
Kosovo story today—rendered in press interviews, on government Web
pages17 and publications of the Serbian Orthodox Church—there is,
strangely, no conflict to speak of, only unmotivated repression and
inexplicable fear. Rather than spinning the strands of recent history into a
narrative that is somehow consistent with the record of ethnic antagonism in
Kosovo, Belgrade simply presents Serb suffering and Albanian terror as two
co-existing but logically unrelated facts. Early and mid twentieth century
Serbian policy on Kosovo was at least honest in its acknowledgment (and
promotion) of conflict. The current administration’s refusal to countenance
hard truths about Kosovo seems, by comparison, disturbingly out of joint
with reality. This is not to say there are not elements of truth in Serbia’s
current Kosovo narrative; in fact, its spokespersons show a mastery of
extracting from isolated facts a plausibility they transfer onto otherwise
jarringly incredible characterizations of the situation in Kosovo.

The Serbian Orthodox Church’s “Post War Human Rights Abuses
against the Serbs and Other Non-Albanians in Kosovo” and “Crucified
Kosovo” are signal examples of this exercise in plausibility-transfer. The
former is a catalogue of Albanian violence directed at Serbs since the 1999
conflict. It mixes faithful, corroborated reports of attacks on Serbs with broad
defamations of the Albanian community and dark speculation about the
political sponsors of Albanian terrorism. “Crucified Kosovo” documents the
destruction of Serbian churches, monasteries, and cemeteries in Kosovo since
1999, with extensive photographic evidence. Both publications allege
international complicity in Albanian violence, and both are widely accepted
in Serbia as fair and accurate. Only through the collusion of the great powers
and the implacably violent Albanians, the Church’s narrative suggests, could
such heinous events, as have happened since 1999, have befallen Kosovo’s
Serbs. These fresh catastrophes have simply hit the Serbian nation out of the
blue, fitting neatly with a predominant view among Serb nationalists that
they are doomed to suffer historically unwarranted misfortunes.18....
http://www.seep.ceu.hu/archives/issue61/herbert.pdf

Grace do you have any idea of how strong the US militairy exactly is?
Any form of guerilla warfare is futile! they have the best and most avanced weapons you can hardly imagine! let alone the weapons that are still top secret!

No country can withstand the awesome military power America posseses!
Guerilla warfare is so 40/50/60's its practiacally usseles now in modern times.