What does the population of FYROM beleive about their nation's origins?

[The Blood of Dorus]

From one of their own, Petar Atanasov (he also mentions the work of Ulf Brunnbauer):

Petar Atanasov, Discussion Paper 32 – South East Europe Series: "Macedonian National Identity: Quantitative Differences Between Unitary and Subaltern National Myths and Narratives", The Centre for the Study of Global Governance.

(The author is Assistant Professor at University of St. Cyril and Methodius and a member of the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research in Skopje, FYR Macedonia. He was a Visiting Fellow with the Faculty Development in South East Europe Programme at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE, in Lent Term 2003/4.)

http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Pu...alIdentity.pdf

An interesting paper, in which Atanasov mentions the results of a survey that was conducted in 2001 with the aim of gathering data in relation to national feelings and the national myths and history of the "ethnic Macedonians". There were 2,004 ethnic Macedonian respondents, and the sample was random and representative.

The last question was: ‘What are the historical roots of the Macedonian state?’, shown in Table 3. This is the most contested part, on the part of Greece and Bulgaria, of the Macedonian national narrative. Previously we stated the Macedonian historiographical version of Macedonian myths and memories. ‘In Macedonian historiography though, “Macedonia” never ceased to exist, and is often portrayed as a collective actor. This discourse is intended to substantiate the Macedonians’ claims to a certain territory, which is portrayed as the homeland of their ancestors’ (Brunnbauer, 2004: 182). So what are the implications of Macedonian historic myths and memories?

Table 3 - Question: What are the historical roots of the Macedonian state?

 18-25 56-65 Prim. School Univ. SDSM VMRO-DPMNE
Alexand. 21.35 19.58 10.79 17.49 24.74 18.33 26.74
Samuil 15.37 13.23 16.55 10.93 18.47 17.19 11.76
Ilinden 24.75 26.46 20.86 24.04 21.95 27.15 31.02
ASNOM 16.78 12.70 25.18 16.39 19.51 17.42 8.02
Indepen. 2.74 2.65 4.32 1.64 1.39 2.71 2.14
Other 4.73 7.94 5.04 5.46 5.57 4.75 5.88
Not know 14.29 17.46 17.27 24.04 8.36 12.44 14.44
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

The average Macedonian thinks that the historical roots of the Macedonian state are connected with the Ilinden uprising (24.75%) or with Alexander the Great (21.35%), and are followed by ASNOM and Czar Samuil. Divergence from the average result was recorded among the age groups 18-25 and 56-65, university-educated respondents and VMRO-DPMNE variables. The younger generation, again, prefer Ilinden (26.46%) compared to ASNOM (12.70%), the older generation prefer ASNOM (25.18%), while primary school-educated respondents prefer the Ilinden uprising (24.04%). Interestingly, among university-educated respondents Alexander the Great (24.74%) was the most popular choice. Bigger differences, again, are spotted between VMRO-DPMNE affiliates, with Ilinden first (31.02%) and Alexander the Great the second choice (26.74%), giving ASNOM barely (8.02%). Again, VMRO-DPMNE affiliates have significant differences not just in the rating of the historical roots, but in the percentage of importance. This supports the argument that ‘alternative political identities have been emerging, different from those laid down by exiting state structures’ (McCrone, 1998: 31). This implies that some social groups have different perspectives on national narratives, view national history differently, or at least have subaltern national ‘versions’. In the Macedonian case, these groups are the older generation aged 56-65, the primary-educated respondents and, to some extent, university-educated groups. In sum, the most important differences are those held by affiliates of the VMRO-DPMNE.

All the above supports this paper’s argument that in the case of the Macedonian national identity there are competing differences between unitary and subaltern national myths and narratives. ‘The governing myth thus coexists with and is constantly contested by subaltern myths, which are capable of generating their own traditions and stories’ (Bell, 2003: 74). This is the case with many nations, both older and younger ones. That means that it is a challenge to statistically research the categories of nation and national identity because of the constant transformation of the forces and agents within culture and history. ‘Even many “established” nations are riven by embedded cultural differences that generate rival symbolic and political projects. In many countries we find the emergence and elaboration of rival visions of the nation’ (Hutchinson, 2000: 661). Identities, both national and other forms of identities, are never fixed and final. They are always in process; they are connected in many ways with cultural, political and state factors; many elements act as their prerequisites and many are the product of the structures and individuals that view them as objective or more often as subjective ‘realities’. Carens argues that identities are partly subjectively determined and partly objectively imposed, and that the mix of these two varies from one context to another. People sometimes experience their identity as given, sometimes as chosen, as sometimes as a combination of the two. ‘[T]he meaning and salience of a given identity varies from one person to another among those who share the identity and may shift over time on both of these respects both for the group as a whole and for individual members within it…’ (Carens, 2000: 15).

So according to the 2001 survey, some 21% of "ethnic Macedonians" think that their history is connected to Alexander, 15% trace it to Samuil, 49% trace it from Ilinden or latter, whilst just over 14% are clueless.

Interesting that only 10.79% of the older generation (those over the age of 56) make any link to Alexander.

[Tsontos]

Whats Vasiliye's thoughts on this?