UK's murky role in Cyprus crisis

[Orphic_Hymn]

UK's murky role in Cyprus crisis
By Jolyon Jenkins
Producer, BBC Radio 4's Document


Major Ted Macey
Major Ted Macey demonstrated weapons to Turkish Cypriots


Evidence has emerged that British undercover forces were involved in fomenting the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots ten years before the 1974 partition of Cyprus.

The new evidence found by BBC Radio 4's programme Document centres on the mystery of Ted Macey, a British army major who was abducted, presumed killed by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries.

I had no strong expectation that we would find the Turkish Cypriot village. We had a 40-year-old British army map, bearing only the old Greek names. Our guide, Martin Packard, had not been here for decades. The countryside was deserted, no one spoke English, and night had fallen.

In 1964, Martin was a naval intelligence officer, sent to Cyprus to do an extraordinary job. Fighting had broken out in the capital, Nicosia, between Greeks and Turks.

Unrest spread, and the British troops in Cyprus stepped in to keep the peace. But the British General, Peter Young, thought that peace meant more than keeping the two sides apart. He believed the communities could live side by side, sometimes in mixed villages, as they had for centuries.

But that meant small disputes had to be prevented from turning into big ones. Gen Young appointed Martin, a fluent Greek speaker, as a roving trouble-shooter and negotiator. With two officers from the mainland Greek and Turkish armies, he roamed the north of Cyprus by helicopter, settling disputes.

Diplomacy

We eventually found the village, and even an interpreter. Here, in Easter 1964, Martin had resolved a conflict over a flock of sheep, stolen from the Turkish villages by their Greek Cypriots neighbours. Martin tracked down the flock in a Greek village.

But none of the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to come with him to get them. So he went himself. He took the youngest lamb and flung it across his shoulder. The mother followed, and so did the rest of the flock.


"It is my feeling they wanted to have fighting
between the two sides.
They didn't want us to get together"
Nicos Koshis

"I walked a very long way, I was very tired, leading this flock of sheep," he said. "We arrived at the village and all of the villagers rushed out as if I were Moses coming back with some great message."

The old men of the village remembered the incident, but were not conspicuously grateful. It was a good thing Martin had got their sheep back, they said, grudgingly, because otherwise they were planning to steal a Greek flock in retaliation.

Martin believes such small episodes were the key to preventing the island drifting towards ethnic separation. But, he says, this was not what the Americans and British had in mind.

He recalls being asked to take a visiting US politician, acting secretary of state George Ball, around the island. Arriving back in Nicosia, says Martin, "Ball patted me on the back, as though I were sadly deluded and he said: That was a fantastic show son, but you've got it all wrong, hasn't anyone told you that our plan here is for partition?"

Cyprus museum

The division that followed - and still exists - caused pain for both sides


Undaunted, Martin pursued plans to move Turkish Cypriots back to the villages they had fled. But just as the first resettlement was about to take place, British General Michael Carver had him arrested and flown off the island - in an unmarked CIA plane.

The ostensible reason was that Cyprus had become too dangerous for Martin to operate in; the evidence given was that a British liaison officer, Major Ted Macey, had been abducted and presumed murdered just a few days before.

All the evidence points to the murder having been carried out by Greek Cypriot extremists.

In the Public Record Office in London, I found files showing that British military commanders in Cyprus had received "very reliable information" that Major Macey's abduction was planned "by Greek security forces with approval of high government circles and connivance of the police to extract information about Turkish invasion plans".

The Greek Cypriots were convinced that Major Macey was aiding the Turks.

Listening bases

Could it be true? I spoke to a former Para who accompanied Major Macey on expeditions to Turkish Cypriot villages. There, says the Para, he demonstrated the use of British ammunition and sub-machine guns to the Turkish Cypriot irregular forces.

I also tracked down one of Major Macey's former drivers, who showed me a curious note, in the major's handwriting. It is a list of arms and explosives being stored in civilian premises in Nicosia: arms, says the driver, which Major Macey had supplied, under British orders, to the Turkish fighters.

So did the peacekeeping forces, and the big powers, really want Cyprus to remain an independent, unitary state? Or was it more important to head off the threat of a "Mediterranean Cuba" by keeping the island within Turkey's - and hence Nato's - sphere of influence?


Britain had, and has, electronic listening bases on the island - important parts of the Nato intelligence effort.

Nicos Koshis, a former justice minister, thinks that it was those bases that determined the fate of the island: "It is my feeling they wanted to have fighting between the two sides. They didn't want us to get together. If the communities come together maybe in the future we say no bases in Cyprus."

You can hear Radio 4's investigation into Britain's role in the 1964 Cyprus conflict in Document on Monday 23 February at 2000GMT or afterwards at the Listen again page

[Orphic_Hymn]

Dhekelia




Akrotiri





By terms of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment that created the independent Republic of Cyprus, the UK retained full sovereignty and jurisdiction over two areas of almost 254 square kilometers in total: Akrotiri and Dhekelia. The larger of these is the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, which is also referred to as the Eastern Sovereign Base Area.
The southernmost and smallest of these is the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area, which is also referred to as the Western Sovereign Base Area

Source :
CIA FACTBOOK.
Akrotiri
Dhekelia


Now to the interesting parts...

In the Treaty of Accession to the EU for Cyprus we find this specific term..

Protocol on the British Sovereign Base Areas

A protocol to the Accession Treaty deals with the British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus (SBAs). The SBAs cover 3% of the island and have open borders with Cyprus. The protocol aims at protecting the interests of those Cypriots resident or working in the SBAs. Hence the open boundaries between the SBAs and the rest of the island will be maintained.

(But who is a resident or a worker in a British only military base ?
Note that Agios Nikolaos in Dhekelia is the well know spying network also known as EHELON)
LINK

It gets even more interesting when we look into the Annan FIASCO that also proposed :

ANNEX II: ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY OF ESTABLISHMENT
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey
Desiring to make provision to give effect to the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom to relinquish sovereignty over parts of the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area,
Have agreed as follows

Article 1
The areas in respect of which the United Kingdom relinquishes its sovereignty are described in the Appendix to this Protocol. Those areas are in this Protocol referred to as the relinquished areas.

Article 2

1 All international obligations and responsibilities of the United Kingdom in relation to the relinquished areas shall henceforth, insofar as they may be held to have application to the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area or the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, be assumed by the United Cyprus Republic.
2. All international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the United Kingdom by virtue of their application to the relinquished areas shall henceforth be enjoyed by the United Cyprus Republic.


(Instead of posting the whole thing, they relinquish some lands but obviously not the two military bases)

Original UN Source (wouldn't work)

Source used

Am I the only one that sees a persistance to acknowledge part of the Cypriot lands as British ??

[Ptolemy]

FANOULA ARGYROU, a professional researcher, looks at allegations made this week in a BBC Radio programme about a British spy ring operating to support the Turkish Cypriots in 1964 and finds that the truth is even more amazing.THE murky side of Britain's role in Cyprus was highlighted this week by a BBC Radio 4 programme that claimed a British spy ring cooperated with the Turkish Cypriots during the troubled days of 1964.

The following summary of the documentary was also available on the same day on the BBC 4's website:

" Ever since the Turkish army invaded and occupied Northern Cyprus in 1974, the partition of the island between ethnic Greeks and Turks has seemed set in stone.

"But the first Green Line, through the capital, was drawn ten years earlier, by a British general (Young) using a green chinagraph pencil that happened to be at hand. Throughout 1964, British troops were on the island, supposedly for peace-keeping. But were they really bringing peace?

"In this programme, Mike Thomson examined new documents that suggest that the real motives of some of the peacekeepers were less than honourable."

The documents reveal the existence of a spy ring of British troops who were materially aiding Turkish insurgents by gun-running and spying on Greek Cypriot military installations.

Although one of the men was caught by the Greek Cypriots, the rest were spirited off the island by the British authorities before the Cypriot police could interrogate them.

The programme also investigated the long-standing mystery of a British army major, who was abducted, presumed murdered, by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries. New documentary evidence uncovered by the programme shows that he, too, was aware of illicit gun-running on behalf of theTurks and that, although the British authorities had good intelligence about the identities of his murderers, they chose not to press the Greek Cypriot authorities to investigate the case.

Intelligence officer

Many Greek Cypriots have long believed that the Nato powers, notably Britain and America, were opposed to the idea of an independent Cyprus because of fears that it could fall into communist hands and become a "Mediterranean Cuba" - a scenario that would have put at risk British electronic spying bases on the island.

The programme assesses the evidence that pro-American elements on the island in 1964 actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island - a situation that came to pass in 1974."

The most striking part of the BBC documentary was the story of Martin Packard, a British naval intelligence officer who was sent to Cyprus from Malta on account of being a fluent speaker of Greek, to help prevent small incidents between Greek and Turks from escalating into serious ones.

It seems, though, that he was taking his mission very seriously, for just as he was being very successful in stopping bloodshed, he was virtually abducted by his superiors, put on a plane and flown out of the island.

Packard related his experience to the BBC that, after mediating successfully between a Greek and a Turkish village over some stolen sheep: "The US Acting Secretary of State George Ball, visiting the island at the time, patted me on the back, as though I were sadly deluded and he said: 'That was a fantastic show son, but you've got it all wrong, hasn't anyone told you that our plan here is for partition?' "

Undaunted, Martin pursued plans to move Turkish Cypriots back to the villages they fled. But as the first settlement was about to take place,
British General Michael Carver had him arrested and flown off the island in an unmarked CIA plane.

[Ptolemy]

Not new documents


I listened to the programme very carefully and as a researcher I have the following comments to make.


It is necessary from the offset to set the record straight by underlining that these documents are not new releases but documents that were released ten years ago and ever since have available for research at the Public Records Office (PRO) in London.


As a regular researcher at the PRO myself, I have seen and researched thoroughly these documents long ago and refer to them in length in two of my books - 'Conspiracy or Blunder?' published in Nicosia in 2000, and 'Top Secret,' also published in Nicosia in 2004.


I have no doubt that the Radio 4 programme, although well intentioned, gave half the truth around the existence of the 'spy ring' in Cyprus that was aiding the Turkish Cypriots.British 'conciliators'

Both Lt Commander Martin Packard and Major Ted Macey were, in fact, working in Cyprus under the instructions of the Foreign Office, specifically under the instructions of high-ranking official Sir Cyril Pickard.

Sir Cyril was at the time an Assistant Under Secretary directly involved with the Cyprus problem.

Their secondment to UNFICYP -?Martin Packard as Conciliator for the Greek Cypriot side and Ted Macey as special Liaison Officer attached to Turkish Cypriot leader Dr Kutchuk's office - had a hidden agenda.

In 1963, Lt Commander Martin Packard was rushed to Cyprus from Malta, where he was serving as a naval intelligence officer.

He mastered the Greek language perfectly.

After his peacekeeping in Cyprus he was awarded an MBE.

Invasion preparations

The same went for Major T. Macey. He mastered both the Greek and Turkish languages and had served in Greece for a number of years.

He had a rough 'Rambo' image and his 'terms of reference' were quite different from those of Packard for obvious reasons if one studies the British documents analytically vis-a-vis the Foreign Office policy of the
period (which has hardly changed at all!).

Macey, indeed, provided the Turkish Cypriots with arms and ammunition, offered them training and, in general, he headed the preparation for an eventual Turkish invasion.


Packard, on the other hand, was working on a different level; that of a friendly conciliator, as the British policy needed the Greek Cypriots to be kept in check, quiet, unarmed, restrained and behaving themselves.


The knowledge of the local languages in these cases was a definite must and the best way to gain the confidence of the people.

According to PRO documents (which refer to a statement made by the then President Archbishop Makarios) Major Macey and his driver were murdered by a ringleader of a gang active in the Famagusta-Larnaca area.


Macey and his driver were accused of spying and working for the Turks.


In another document, it is revealed that two Greek Cypriot informants gave the British authorities information as to the place where the bodies lay.

The informants were helped by the British authorities to take asylum in England and also received the 72,000 reward offered.


Macey was also employed to make visits to Greek and Turkish villages throughout Cyprus (just like Martin Packard) reporting on the state of feeling in the countryside. In other words, both were engaged in collecting
intelligence in a manner undetected by the locals and keeping things in check for their superiors.


The Foreign Office also regarded the positioning of British officers within the UN a necessity, in order to be privy to all information received by the UN. " His special experience (Macey's) enabled him to play a unique role in
efforts to maintain peace and save lives through his personal contacts with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots," it was noted in a report in the PRO files.


The British documents reveal the true 'unique' role of T. Macey as a British 'spy ring leader' aiding the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek Cypriots.


Martin Packard's superiors, fearing for his life, days after Macey's murder, rushed him out of Cyprus via a CIA plane that took him to an American base in Greece.British subversion


As it was correctly stated in the BBC programme, British officers were directly involved in subversive activities on the island: the manufacture of bombs, bombing Turkish properties to blame the Greek Cypriots, espionage and so on.


Their main objective was to de-stabilise Cyprus, bring chaos and confusion and assist the Turks in the execution of their long-term plans.


As Nicos Koshis stated, the British policy was to keep the two communities separated. But with an enlarged hidden agenda.


In February 1964, Archbishop Makarios handed a document to the British High Commissioner regarding those activities.


He referred to the case of Colonel Thursby who, on January 20, 1964, went to the Manager of the Cyprus Asbestos Mines Co Ltd and, under false pretences, demanded to be allowed to collect all the explosives in the stores.

Makarios also wrote to General Gyani (UN force) complaining and listing instances when British troops with the UN contingent did nothing to stop Turks from firing at Greek Cypriots. Marley (mentioned in the programme), Bachelor, Bass (mentioned), Heron, Tyft, Offard and Jones are among those accused of aiding and providing the Turks with arms, ammunition and other military equipment.

Some of those arrested had given sensational information but the Cypriot authorities were totally ignorant of the even more damning information they could have extracted.


But they did not have the chance. The British authorities, who knew full well the extent of the consequences in such a case, quickly arranged for them to be flown out of Cyprus. Marley, who was arrested (as stated in the programme) and gave vital information under interrogation, was tried and condemned to 15 years imprisonment.


However, the British authorities again 'arranged' with the then Attorney General (ex Colonial employee) Tornaritis (and not the Cypriot Government) to get him out of for health reasons.

Partition plans

Although Martin Packard refers to George Ball's statement regarding "their policy being partition," he and the programmers make no mention whatsoever of the policy of the Foreign Office, which is clearly demonstrated in no uncertain terms through the PRO files.


In fact, George Ball was at the time referring to the British plans to which he and his department were privy.


In February, 1964, the Planning Department of the Foreign Office (Packard's superiors) devised a comprehensive plan named ' The Future of Cyprus' which stated: "It is now clear that any long term solution in Cyprus must involve geographical separation of the Greek and Turkish communities.


"This could of, course, be achieved by wholesale removal of the Turkish community elsewhere. Less drastic alternatives following some redeployment of the population in the island are:


"a Partition so that a predominantly Greek area is united with Greece and a predominantly Turkish area is united with Turkey.


"b Partition so that one or both areas are independent, perhaps with special relationships with Greece and Turkey respectively, or


"c A Federal Constitution, in which the island would be divided into cantons, one or two of which were Turkish.

"It would already be difficult for the Greeks to intervene successfully in Cyprus. The Turks would have completed their intervention before they could prevent it.


"The obvious Greek counter-move would be to invade Turkish Thrace. One way of preventing this would be for a small force drawn from all NATO countries to police the frontier.


"We could make much greater use of United States and British naval power to deter Greek naval assault across the Aegean. The ability of the Greeks to mount an airborne intervention is strictly limited.".


(A month before, in London, where representatives of both communities were summoned for a conference, Rauf Denktash had placed on the table in the presence of Glafcos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, Stella Soulioti and
others his and Turkey's demands i.e. geographical federation...). ?


From the masses of the PRO documents released so far, one can build upon the theory that it was in fact the British and not the Americans who thought of, prepared and instigated the Greek Junta takeover in Greece in 1967, in order to achieve their planning objectives over Cyprus.

The Americans were used as and when it suited the British, always retaining a secondary and assisting role to date.


?False accusations


Upon leaving Cyprus, Martin Packard prepared a report, which he handed to his superiors, in which he accused the Greek Cypriots of slaughtering 27 Turkish Cypriots in the Nicosia General Hospital.


His accusations appeared on April 2, 1988 in the 'Guardian' newspaper through his friend at the time Chief Editor of the paper Peter Preston, who, in 1964, was also working in Cyprus.


On February 10, 1994 Channel 4 Television showed a documentary called 'Secret Story - Dead or Alive' which in a way addressed the drama of the 1,619 missing Greek Cypriots since the brutal Turkish invasion of Cyprus in
July 1974.

Martin Packard made an unexpected appearance to say that in 1963/64 he had prepared a report in which he included that: "The largest single element of these missing people were the Turkish Cypriot patients at the General Hospital. Nothing had been heard of any of them. It was assumed that they were being held in custody somewhere. The outcome of my investigation suggested that they had all of them been killed in the General Hospital. They had been removed at night, the bodies from there had been taken out to outlying farms up in the region of Skilloura and out there they had been dismembered and passed through farm dicing machines and they had then been seeded into the ploughed land."


I found these accusations too horrific to be true. Immediately, I wrote to the then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Heathcoat-Amory and demanded to be allowed to view Packard's report.


As he spoke about this report having definitely not been released, I found Mr Packard's liberty to disclose such damning secret information, with no evidence at all to substantiate it, extraordinarily questionable.


Five-year fight


I raised the issue that he either had breached the Official Secrets Act as he spoke from knowledge of a report still retained or he spoke in his capacity of a British conciliator with the Department's permission. Whatever
the case, we had a right to see the evidence of what he was so freely accusing us.


My fight with the Foreign Office and other government departments lasted five years (1994-1999) until he was finally 'ordered' to close the matter by withdrawing the accusations.


Peter Preston, with an article in the 'Guardian' (which was equally guilty and responsible for printing unsubstantiated allegations), on May 3, 1999, wrote that Martin Packard revisited the island and found out that he was given wrong information, no evidence at all, and that in fact no Turkish Cypriot had been harmed.

[Ptolemy]

wrote an article in Simerini on May 18, 1999 and another one was written by Charalambos Charalambides on May 19, 1999, finally revealing the truth.


Packard was wrong and had no evidence whatsoever for those horrific allegations against us.


The damage, however, to the Greek side was immeasurable. The Turks had used Packard's allegations to the full and in all international forums, as admitted by Peter Preston.


Packard was obliged to write to Kofi Annan withdrawing the allegations and restoring the truth, which is that no Turkish Cypriot had been killed.

They were all protected under Makarios's orders.


And that was the result of Packard's role in Cyprus in 1964 which had nothing to do with petty conflicts over..sheep between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.?Finally: "The programme assesses the evidence that pro-American elements on the island in 1964 actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island - a situation that came to pass in 1974", is stated on the BBC 4's
website.

This is totally wrong.


The British documents reveal exactly the opposite. I find it extraordinary after such a broadcast to reach such a ridiculous assumption!


It was not the so called pro-American elements on the island in 1964 who actively conspired to foment inter-communal strife in order to justify the effective partition of the island, but the very British intelligence men -
the 'spy ring' - as they chose to name them under direct orders of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

They were the ones who were aided on the island by their pro-British elements within both communities who in their own way assisted the British and Turkish partitionist policy to gain ground.


This was an assistance they enjoy to this very day with disastrous results for our national cause.



Fanoulla Argyrou


Researcher/author


London


24.1.2006

[Tsontos]

Kissinger’s Secret Phone Calls Concerning Cyprus

BY: Alekos


The following is a translation of an article which appeared in Eleftherotypia on July 20. It includes a transcript of telephone conversations between Kissinger and CIA Director William Colby.
Kissinger’s Secret Phone Calls Concerning Cyprus

Makarios Drousiotis

The morning of the 20th of July, 1974 when the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was announced, Henry Kissinger was in San Clement, California, where President Nixon had his vacation residence.

In California, it was late in the afternoon. Kissinger had continued telephone conversations with President Nixon, CIA Director William Colby, his British counterpart James Callahan and other State Department officials in Washington.

Kissinger was trying to enact his strategy, which was aimed at avoiding a war between Greece and Turkey and negotiating the Cyprus conflict after the successful landing of Turkish forces on the island. For this to succeed, Greece could not get involved in resisting the Turkish invasion and treat this problem as one that merely concerned Cyprus.

According to the testimony of commander Nikolopoulos, at 6:00 a.m. on July 20, when it became evident that there were Turkish landing operations, in his capacity as the information officer, appealed to the Commander of the Armed Forces Gregorios Bonanos, asking him to give the order to mobilize his fleet. Bonanos answered, “Turks are attacking Cyprus, but we are Greece.” The stance of the Junta leadership, that developments in Cyprus did not concern Greece, was also known to the Director of the CIA, William Colby, explained this to Henry Kissinger in a telephone conversation at 7:35 a.m. on July 20. In that same conversation, Colby also told Kissinger that the Turks would not occupy the entire island and would only advance as far as Amohostos. The capture of Amohostos occurred twenty-four days later, on August 14.

Kissinger: Hello?

Colby: Hi Henry!

Kissinger: Bill, how are you? I am sorry I kept you on the line.

Colby: No problem.

Kissinger: I simply wanted to check with you and verify that you will also things closely. I am in San Clement- can you send us your supporting facts and projections here?

Colby: Sure, fine.

Kissinger: And also, what is the Turkish capability of landing troops? Do you know exactly?

Colby: It is very strong. (some static follows)

Kissinger: One regiment is how many? Two thousand?

Colby: It’s two or three thousand, yes.

Kissinger: And how many can they send?

Colby: (The answer is unintelligible)

Kissinger: How many is that?

Colby: It looks like they are going to Kyrenia, on the north shore. That is the first step.

Kissinger: What do you think their objective is? They don’t want the whole island, right?

Colby: No, no. What they want it Kyrenia and Amohostos and a line between the two.

Kissinger: So, only the northeast quarter.

Colby: Yes. So, say approximately (unintelligible) from Larnaca and up, since they are advancing they will be in a position to bargain.

“The locals will fight”

Kissinger: What do you think the Greeks will do?

Colby: The local Greeks will fight and there are several reports of bombing in Kyrenia. Primarily the National Guard will put up a fight. It depends on how much power the commanding officers have.

Kissinger: They will fight.

Colby: We will have a very undesirable situation in Cyprus. To be honest, the Greeks are a little far off. Their air force is too far away to be deployed. They won’t be able to do much from there.

Kissinger: Even from Rhodes?

Colby: Excuse me?

Kissinger: Even from Rhodes?

Colby: Their central air base is back in Greece, near Athens.

Kissinger: What is the relative strength of the two armies?

Colby: The Turks number around 300,000, and the Greeks around 100,000. But most of the Greek forces are located further North, inThrace. If there were to be any kind of conflict, it would be there, up in the northern region, near Thessaloniki.

Kissinger: Do you have any good ideas for what we should do?

Colby: I believe that the most important thing is to convince the Greeks not to fight, to say we’ll negotiate and discuss what should happen.

Kissinger: Alright.

“Let’s keep it in Cyprus”

Colby: Their basic stance is that it concerns the internal affairs of Cyprus. You know, they will save face by saying, “That was a local issue. It isn’t Greece.”

Kissinger: Yes, alright. Thank you.

Colby: In a way they will be able to say, “Yes it was a big mistake on that island, but we are above that.” I believe that the most important thing is that we should keep it limited to Cyprus and not let it advance from there.

Kissinger: Alright, Thank you.

Colby: Update me with any additional information you may have, Henry.

Kissinger: Thanks. Bye.

“I don’t give a damn”

Approximately an hour later, Kissinger discusses the issue of Cyprus again with CIA director William Colby:

Kissinger: Divisions? They are on water?

Colby: (unintelligible)

Kissinger: Indeed. Colby can I tell you something?

Colby: Yes

Kissinger: I don’t even know where the hell Amohostos is. Can I tell you something else?

Colby: What?

Kissinger: I don’t give a damn. Will someone bring me a map? Just because you can throw some name in my face doesn’t make you smart.

Colby: (laughs)

Kissinger: You most likely have a map in front of you. Is it Amohostos?

Colby: Yes, in the East?

Kissinger: I have it in front of me. You mean it will proceed by land? Will they take the whole island?

Colby: No, they will just make a landing. They have landed in Kyrenia on the northern side and several parachutes have fallen over Lefkosia.

Kissinger: Why?

Colby: Because it’s the capital and because there isn’t much of a Turkish population between there and Kyrenia in the North. This way they can make advance to them more easily.

Kissinger: Do you think they will take Lefkosia?

Colby: Yes, uh, there will be several battles there. But, you see, what they will be able to do is land at the airport there and meet up with troops advancing from the sea in the North, then they will fight the National Guard in that region. Of course, there will be some severe fighting there. Later they will have a landing in Amohostos on the eastern side and one further down in Larnaca, on the southeastern front. Their goal will be to strengthen their position for three or four days, but that is less certain, and later they will be in a position to negotiate. The problem is that the Greeks can only defend themselves in that region (Cyprus). In reality, they cannot get enough support from Greece since the majority of the forces are located in the North, near Thessaloniki and Thrace.

“Double union”

Kissinger: You mean they will only be able to defend themselves with what they have on the island?

Colby: With the National Guard on the island, around 30 thousand troops, a large number.

Kissinger: They have 30 thousand National Guardsmen? I thought it was nine thousand.

Coby: No, excuse me, nine thousand ready to deploy, around thirty thousand total.
Kissinger: But they won’t be able to mobilize them.

An unintelligible dialogue (Kissinger) follows. Colby, in answering a question to Kissinger, responds with the comment: “It could result in a double union.”

Eleftherotypia – 07/20/2004


http://www.aegeantimes.net/index.php?name=...rder=0&sid=1043

[akritas]

Very good topic BigTakis.
You open the big issue regarding the Kissinger and the US involve regarding the Turkish invasion in Cyprus

[Tsontos]

BTW, check the date on the last telegram, May 74. The Americans knew/arranged it prior to May 74, that's more than 2 months before it took place.

[Tsontos]

Brendan O'Malley at MIT

Originally Posted by Brendan O'Malley at MIT

In 1971 NATO powers once more began secret talks on the future of Cyprus in Lisbon and Paris. US analysts believed a deal for double enosis was on the cards, but it would have to be initiated by Greek action against Makarios because this could be passed off as an internal affair between Greeks, and would stand more chance of avoiding Soviet intervention. A senior Turkish official reported that at the talks Turkey demanded a break-up of the Cypriot state and the Greeks seemed willing to offer a military base.

Following the meeting, Grivas who had been pulled out of Cyprus in 1967, was allowed to return to set up a second EOKA organisation called EOKA-B, dedicated to the overthrow of Makarios and union with Greece. Cypriot officials later told former US Ambassador Taylor Belcher in the strongest terms that there was documentary evidence that the CIA was financing EOKA-B through money passed through the Junta in Athens

Makarios, on the other hand, sought to bolster his position by making an eight-day visit to Moscow and landing Czech arms to prepare against a possible coup. This prompted more fears in the West that he was becoming a Castro of the Mediterranean who, backed by the strongest communist party in the Middle East, might hand the island to the Eastern Bloc, allowing the Soviets to turn the south-eastern flank of NATO.

There is some evidence to suggest a co-ordinated response by Greece and Turkey. When, in retaliation, Papadopoulos ordered a coup against Makarios in February 1972 the Turks and Turkish Cypriots were informed of the plan in advance, which ties in with the schemes for double-enosis mooted by the

Americans and at NATO. Glafkos Clerides told me that Makarios's intelligence services first heard of the danger of that coup from decoding messages sent from Turkey to the Turkish Cypriots telling them to store food in their homes and to be on alert.

SNIP

Callaghan said "high-level" State Department officials repeatedly made representations urging the British not to abandon their bases and intelligence stations. This was a very serious issue for the Americans because under an annex to Cyprus's 1960 independence agreements, negotiated after the main framework was in place, the Americans could not have taken over the running of the British spying sites in the bases or Cypriot territory if Britain pulled out. Callaghan told me: "The Cold War was hotting up and and there were new Soviet missile test facilities being developed near the Caspian Sea, which we were able to look over. So the Americans didn't want us to go." So when Ioannides decided to try to cut Makarios down to size in July 1974, it gave the Americans the opportunity they had been waiting for to split the island.

On at least seven occasions previously, many of them when the Greeks had taken the law into their own hands on Cyprus, Ankara had mobilised for war only to be held back by pressure from Washington. Given these historical precedents, and the history of the United States talking to each side about the plans to carve up the island between them, decisive American pressure on Ioannides not to stage a coup in Nicosia or on Ecevit not to respond with a military intervention was the only way to prevent the division of the island in 1974.

Damning evidence from the CIA and State Department Bureau of Intelligence shows that Washington was repeatedly warned of the junta's intention to overthrow Makarios and of Turkey's preparations for a retaliatory invasion, but the State Department failed to act to stop them, as it had in the past, when Tasca forcefully warned Papadopoulos against any heavy stuff in 1972 and Johnson issued his explosive veto to Turkey in 1964. CIA analysts reported that in 1974 "more and clearer warning of the coup against Makarios was given in this case than is usual". Yet Tasca testified that he was never given any firm evidence and if he had been he would have turned the place upside down to make sure Ioannides got the message. Communications with Ioannides had been conducted not by him but the CIA and he only knew what the CIA chose to tell him. Ioannides himself later claimed that far from dissuading him, the United States had encouraged him to go ahead with the coup.

[Tsontos]

"Fuck your Parliament and your Constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. If these two fleas continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good.... We pay a lot of good American dollars to the Greeks, Mr. Ambassador. If your Prime Minister gives me talk about Democracy, Parliament and Constitutions, he, his Parliament and his Constitution may not last very long."
-President Lyndon B. Johnson

-From the book:

Deane, Philip. "I Should Have Died." Atheneum, New York, 1977. Pp113-114. Composed of conversations with Greek and American individuals in or close to the conspiracy, and references to testimony from the 1975 trials of the junta members and torturers