akritas
02-24-2006, 05:09 PM
From the Book a Short History of Modern Greece, 1821-1956 by Edward S. Forster
The opening of hostilities in Asia Minor
OPERATIONS in Asia Minor began at the end of March 1921. The Greek General Staff (who seem to have had no idea of the growing strength of the Turkish National Movement and the support which it was receiving from other countries) were convinced that victory was certain and that Greece would receive a vast extension of territory. The dream of Constantinople again in Greek hands was at last to come true, and Constantine was hailed in the Royalist press as destined to be crowned Emperor in Santa Sophia.
Condition of the Greek Army.
But the enterprise was doomed from the first. The army was ill-equipped 1 (http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10476141#1)and lacking in munitions, and there were no funds in the Treasury to remedy these deficiencies. The Corps of officers was rent by political differences; many of those who had led the Greek divisions to victory on the Macedonian front had been superseded by the appointment of Royalist sympathizers, who had taken no part in the operations of 1918 and had had no training in the latest developments of warfare. So many adherents of the Government in power had received promotion that there were more generals and colonels than posts for them to fill. In these conditions the Army required an experienced Commander-in-Chief who could enforce an iron discipline and stand up against the pressure exerted by the politicians. General Papoulas, who received the appointment, was singularly lacking in these qualifications, his chief claim to command being that he had suffered for his loyalty to King Constantine in his exile. He proved incompetent and was continually at loggerheads with the General Staff.
The advance into Asia Minor.
At first the Greek Army made appreciable progress in its advance into Asia Minor. There was as yet no considerable Turkish force to oppose it but merely bands of irregulars who carried on guerrilla warfare, in which every little success gained by the Greeks was hailed as a brilliant victory. The important railway-junctions, however, of Afium Karahissar and Eski Shehr were captured, but the Greeks sustained a serious reverse to the northwest of the latter town on 2nd April and were compelled to retreat. On 11th June King Constantine left Athens for Smyrna with M. Gounaris, who had become Prime Minister in April, M. Theotokis, Minister of War, and General Dousmanis representing the General Staff. The last-named urged that the King should assume the supreme command of the Army, but this was opposed by the politicians, with the result that the King held aloof from the direction of affairs
Attitude of the Entente Powers.
In June the Greek Army was concentrated in two groups, a smaller body at Brousa and the main body near Ushak. Not only were these two groups widely separated from one another but the main body was served by a single railway-line from Smyrna which passed through enemy country and required a large detachment of troops to guard it. During the same month the British, French, and Italian Governments, who in May had proclaimed a state of neutrality towards both the Greeks and the Turks in the zone which they occupied in the area adjoining the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, volunteered their services to negotiate peace between the belligerents, but the Greeks rejected their offer.
The offensive of June 1921.
A fresh offensive opened on 15th June and resulted in the recapture of Afium Karahissar and Eski Shehr and an advance first to Katahia and then to Sivri Hissar, which lies some sixty miles from Ankara, the seat of the Turkish Nationalist Government. The Greek G.H.Q. seems to have thought that the Turkish withdrawal was a rout, but, in fact, the retirement had been made in perfect order. The Greek Commander-in-Chief is said to have wished to halt at the point which he had reached and avoid further risk, but the Prime Minister and Minister for War urged that Ankara must be captured and the enemy defeated.
Difficulties of the ground.
The country over which the Greeks had now to advance was a more or less desert and waterless land mostly devoid of inhabitants -- a formidable obstacle to an army almost entirely lacking in the means of communication and transport. It involved indescribable hardships and privations for the Greek Army. On the plateau of Central Asia Minor the rainy season sets in early
in the autumn and the roads, which are mere cart-tracks, soon become morasses almost impassable to heavy wheeled traffic.
The enemy allowed the Greeks to advance until they reached a battle-ground of Mustapha Kemal's own choosing -- the line of the Sakharia River, where the heights on the farther bank formed an ideal position for an effective defence.
On 7th August the Greek Commander-in-Chief issued orders, in which he said: 'The whole army will attack so as to annihilate the principal enemy force, will pursue them until they are dispersed, and will then advance to Ankara and destroy the enemy's stores there and the railway line'.
Defeat of the Greeks on the Sakharia River.
But fate had decided otherwise. The Greek Army was exhausted by its long march through the desert; it was short of every kind of food, except meat, which could not be cooked for lack of fuel; petrol had run short, and the horses were weak through lack of barley and forage; the ammunition was almost at an end and could not be replaced. The Turkish Army, on the other hand, was entrenched in a strong position not far from its base, was fighting in defence of its newly-chosen capital and was inspired with enthusiasm for the Nationalist Movement; above all its leader, Mustapha Kemal, was a born military genius. The result was a foregone conclusion -a disastrous defeat, though the Greek soldiery fought with characteristic stubbornness. The casualties were enormous, and would have been even greater if the enemy had done more to press home their advantage.
Retreat of the Greeks.
September was occupied with the retreat to the line Eski Shehr -- Afium Karahissar, and at the end of the month King Constantine returned to Athens broken in health. It remained for Greece to find a solution for an impossible situation, the gravity of which was hidden as far as possible from the Greeks at home. The only possible course seemed to be to appeal to the Powers to help Greece out of the impasse, and the Prime Minister accompanied by M. Baltatzis, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, set out for the European capitals.
The opening of hostilities in Asia Minor
OPERATIONS in Asia Minor began at the end of March 1921. The Greek General Staff (who seem to have had no idea of the growing strength of the Turkish National Movement and the support which it was receiving from other countries) were convinced that victory was certain and that Greece would receive a vast extension of territory. The dream of Constantinople again in Greek hands was at last to come true, and Constantine was hailed in the Royalist press as destined to be crowned Emperor in Santa Sophia.
Condition of the Greek Army.
But the enterprise was doomed from the first. The army was ill-equipped 1 (http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10476141#1)and lacking in munitions, and there were no funds in the Treasury to remedy these deficiencies. The Corps of officers was rent by political differences; many of those who had led the Greek divisions to victory on the Macedonian front had been superseded by the appointment of Royalist sympathizers, who had taken no part in the operations of 1918 and had had no training in the latest developments of warfare. So many adherents of the Government in power had received promotion that there were more generals and colonels than posts for them to fill. In these conditions the Army required an experienced Commander-in-Chief who could enforce an iron discipline and stand up against the pressure exerted by the politicians. General Papoulas, who received the appointment, was singularly lacking in these qualifications, his chief claim to command being that he had suffered for his loyalty to King Constantine in his exile. He proved incompetent and was continually at loggerheads with the General Staff.
The advance into Asia Minor.
At first the Greek Army made appreciable progress in its advance into Asia Minor. There was as yet no considerable Turkish force to oppose it but merely bands of irregulars who carried on guerrilla warfare, in which every little success gained by the Greeks was hailed as a brilliant victory. The important railway-junctions, however, of Afium Karahissar and Eski Shehr were captured, but the Greeks sustained a serious reverse to the northwest of the latter town on 2nd April and were compelled to retreat. On 11th June King Constantine left Athens for Smyrna with M. Gounaris, who had become Prime Minister in April, M. Theotokis, Minister of War, and General Dousmanis representing the General Staff. The last-named urged that the King should assume the supreme command of the Army, but this was opposed by the politicians, with the result that the King held aloof from the direction of affairs
Attitude of the Entente Powers.
In June the Greek Army was concentrated in two groups, a smaller body at Brousa and the main body near Ushak. Not only were these two groups widely separated from one another but the main body was served by a single railway-line from Smyrna which passed through enemy country and required a large detachment of troops to guard it. During the same month the British, French, and Italian Governments, who in May had proclaimed a state of neutrality towards both the Greeks and the Turks in the zone which they occupied in the area adjoining the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, volunteered their services to negotiate peace between the belligerents, but the Greeks rejected their offer.
The offensive of June 1921.
A fresh offensive opened on 15th June and resulted in the recapture of Afium Karahissar and Eski Shehr and an advance first to Katahia and then to Sivri Hissar, which lies some sixty miles from Ankara, the seat of the Turkish Nationalist Government. The Greek G.H.Q. seems to have thought that the Turkish withdrawal was a rout, but, in fact, the retirement had been made in perfect order. The Greek Commander-in-Chief is said to have wished to halt at the point which he had reached and avoid further risk, but the Prime Minister and Minister for War urged that Ankara must be captured and the enemy defeated.
Difficulties of the ground.
The country over which the Greeks had now to advance was a more or less desert and waterless land mostly devoid of inhabitants -- a formidable obstacle to an army almost entirely lacking in the means of communication and transport. It involved indescribable hardships and privations for the Greek Army. On the plateau of Central Asia Minor the rainy season sets in early
in the autumn and the roads, which are mere cart-tracks, soon become morasses almost impassable to heavy wheeled traffic.
The enemy allowed the Greeks to advance until they reached a battle-ground of Mustapha Kemal's own choosing -- the line of the Sakharia River, where the heights on the farther bank formed an ideal position for an effective defence.
On 7th August the Greek Commander-in-Chief issued orders, in which he said: 'The whole army will attack so as to annihilate the principal enemy force, will pursue them until they are dispersed, and will then advance to Ankara and destroy the enemy's stores there and the railway line'.
Defeat of the Greeks on the Sakharia River.
But fate had decided otherwise. The Greek Army was exhausted by its long march through the desert; it was short of every kind of food, except meat, which could not be cooked for lack of fuel; petrol had run short, and the horses were weak through lack of barley and forage; the ammunition was almost at an end and could not be replaced. The Turkish Army, on the other hand, was entrenched in a strong position not far from its base, was fighting in defence of its newly-chosen capital and was inspired with enthusiasm for the Nationalist Movement; above all its leader, Mustapha Kemal, was a born military genius. The result was a foregone conclusion -a disastrous defeat, though the Greek soldiery fought with characteristic stubbornness. The casualties were enormous, and would have been even greater if the enemy had done more to press home their advantage.
Retreat of the Greeks.
September was occupied with the retreat to the line Eski Shehr -- Afium Karahissar, and at the end of the month King Constantine returned to Athens broken in health. It remained for Greece to find a solution for an impossible situation, the gravity of which was hidden as far as possible from the Greeks at home. The only possible course seemed to be to appeal to the Powers to help Greece out of the impasse, and the Prime Minister accompanied by M. Baltatzis, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, set out for the European capitals.