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akritas
02-18-2006, 02:15 PM
The Albanians are divided into two groups, the Geghs of the north (who tend to be Muslim with a minority that is Catholic) and the Tosks of the south (who also are predominately Muslim, but include a substantial number of Orthodox as well). Additionally, the Geghs (who live in northern Albania and Kosovo) are less urbanized than the Tosks and, traditionally, have been more conservative. The 1913 declaration of Albanian independence was rather rhetorical since the country soon fell into anarchy, and during World War I (1914-18) Serb and Greek forces occupied its northern and southern parts.

The origins of the minority question in Greek-Albanian relations are directly linked with the drawing of the boundary between Albania and
Greece. Following the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, the Great Powers, the Balkan states, and the Ottoman Empire negotiated the final territorial gains that the Balkan states would get from the defeated Ottoman Empire. In these negotiations, Greece was offered a choice between territory in southern Albania and the Aegean Islands. The Greek government chose the Aegean Islands. Consequently, the international committee responsible for finalizing the boundary between

Greece and Albania did not satisfy Greek claims and included a contested region of the south into the Albanian state. Subsequently, the Greeks in the regions of Gyrogaster (Argyrokastro) and Korce (Korytsa) revolted and asked for Greek troops to intervene. To avoid a direct confrontation, the parties signed the Protocol of Corfu (1914), which granted autonomy to the Greek minority. By 1914, following the declaration of World War I and with encouragement by the Entente, Greek forces returned to the region and occupied it militarily. It was during this period that the Greek army conducted a survey of the region and published in 1919 a map of the southern part of Albania where the region is officially called “Northern Epirus.” Subsequently, the term was adopted into Greek discourse, in spite of the fact that the survey was (obviously) biased. In 1920, an international committee set out to redraw the new state's boundaries. The committee's final decision left a portion of the Greek population within Albanian territory and, likewise, a portion of the Albanian population within Greek territory. The former region became known as Northern Epirus, while the latter region, home to approximately 20,000 Albanians, became henceforth known as Chameria(Thesprotia in Greek).

The “minority question” was a concern for Theodoros Pangalos, whose coup d'état took place on 25 June 1925. Pangalos considered himself a friend of Albania, spoke Albanian, and was proud of his half-Albanian origin. Under his regime, the two states moved decisively to normalize relations in a whole range of topics, from commercial relations to citizenship laws. Indeed, the two countries agreed on mutually accepted guidelines and regulations whose goal was to sort out who was Albanian and who was Greek. This was a vexing question because there was no clear-cut way of differentiating between the two. The two states established mutually accepted rules according to which people had to make a choice within a certain period with regard to their preferred citizenship.

Albanian-Greek relations took a negative turn in 1927, when the administration of the Greek Ministry of Agriculture realized the consequences of the original agreement regarding the compensation of land originally owned by Albanian landlords that had been expropriated by the Greek state. These Albanian land properties were estimated to be around one million stremmas (1 stremma = 0.10 hectares). The amount of money required for compensation was deemed exuberant and, consequently, the initial Greek-Albanian agreement was never ratified by the parliament (Mihalopoulos, 1987:66-71).

The resulting impasse led to a new round of Albanian complaints in 1928. The complaints raised two issues: the land question and the treatment of the Chams. With regard to the Chams, the Albanian government complained that the Greek government was persecuting the minority.

There was little evidence of direct state persecution, but the Albanians insisted that the Greek state open minority schools for the Chams, which the Greek side firmly opposed. Also, the Albanian government complained that the Chams' property was expropriated and given to Greek refugees from Anatolia. The Greek government replied that this was done in consultation with the local religious authorities of the Albanian community, and it concerned solely the necessity to find temporary accommodation for the refugees (Mihalopoulos, 1987:95-97). Over time the list of complaints was extended to the Chams' effective denial of their right to get elected in local elections. The reports of a League of Nations committee and the reply by the Greek government reveal that part of the bone of contention concerned the change in the status of the local Albanian landlords. In Ottoman times, the overlords received revenues from neighboring villages. But the peasants refused to pay tribute after their land was occupied by the Greek state and in this case they “expropriated” what the Albanian overlords considered to be their property (Mihalopoulos, 1987:108-9). In June 1928, the League of Nations turned down the Albanian petition against Greece. The compensation for land properties had not been paid until 1933; and when it was paid it fell short of Albanian expectations. As a result of these Greek-Albanian confrontations, the Chams were viewed with suspicion by the Greek state authorities.

The Italian attack onGreece in 1940 took place through Albanian territory; this led toGreece declaring war on Albania. The formal state of war existed until the late 1980s. When Greece entered into war against Italy in October 1940, the Greek authorities disarmed 1,800 Champ conscripts and put them to work on local roads, while the next month they deported all remaining Albanian males to camps or to island exile (Mazower, 2000:25). In 1941, in the aftermath of the German occupation ofGreece , the Albanian government at the time submitted a report to the Italian government where it spelled out the Albanian demands on Greece. These included territorial demands on the Greek province of Epirus, which was deemed by the Albanians to be populated by a majority of Albanians.


During World War II, the Italians who occupied Albania in the post-1939 period organized the creation of a Greater Albania in an effort to attract Albanian support for their occupation (Fischer, 1999:61-88). Indeed, the Albanian government asked for the “unification” of Chameria, Kosovo, and western Macedonia into a single Albanian state (Mihalopoulos, 1987:161-62). This instance is among the few open declarations of Albanian irredentism in the twentieth century. During the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers, the Italian government arranged to have Kosovo united with Albania (Malcolm, 1998:291). On this occasion, Albanian schools were opened in Kosovo for the first time since the 1910s (Logoreci, 1977:69-70). When Italy surrendered to the Allies, the Germans took over from the Italians and followed a similar policy of fostering Albanian independence and nationalism in Kosovo. They set up a second League of Prizren, named after the first League of Prizren (1878), the first Albanian nationalist organization. They also armed close to 15,000 Kosovo Albanians (Malcolm, 1998:305).



During the occupation of Greece by the Axis powers, the Albanian minority in Chameria campaigned for the annexation of the region into the Albanian state and enrolled in armed units sponsored by the Italians. Additionally, several hundred Chams enrolled in the anti-communist and nationalist movement Balli Kombetar (to be discussed later on in this chapter). From 1943 the armed Chams joined the German forces in burning Greek villages (Mazower, 2000:25; Antonopoulos, 1999:102-3). With the withdrawal of the German forces in 1944, the Greek right-wing guerrilla forces of the National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimorkatikos Ellinikos Syndesmos), commanded by Napoleon Zervas, made an offer to the Chams to join them against the communist guerrilla forces of ELAS. When the Chams turned down this offer, Zervas ordered a general attack against the Chams, an action supported by the peasants whose villages had been burned down by the Chams and who were all too eager to extract revenge. Many of the Chams' villages were burned and most of the Chams (around 18,000) fled to Albania.


During World War II, three military guerrilla movements developed in Albania. The first was organized by the pro-royalist forces of Abas Kupi, a former officer of the germanderie under the reign of King Zogu. Its power base was in the northern part of the country. The second movement was the Balli Kombetar (National Front), under the leadership of distinguished writer, diplomat, and scholar Midhat Frasheri. This was a republican movement and it supported a program of social, political, and agrarian reforms. Frasheri, its leader, was the son of Abdul Frasheri, one of the three legendary Frasheri brothers who were the protagonists of the post-1878 Albanian national movement. The organization's program included the unification of all Albanian areas; this coincided with the Italian-sponsored Greater Albania.5 The third movement was the communist guerrilla movement that developed in close association with the Yugoslav Communist Party. Eventually, civil war broke out, and in the course of the 1943-44 period, the communists were successful in eradicating all resistance by the other two movements (Logoreci, 1977:72-80; for details, see Fischer, 1999).

akritas
02-18-2006, 02:23 PM
After World War II, Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha was angered by Greek claims that Albania should be placed on the side of the Axis allies. Both sides sought retribution from each other. Because neither side would cede, the formal state of war between the two states remained in effect for several decades. With the end of World War II, the right-wing Greek government felt that Greece was entitled to Northern Epirus as compensation for Greece's participation in World War II on the side of the Allies.

The Greek government also invited British troops to enter the country and help the government deal with the Greek communists, who, in the aftermath of the German withdrawal from Greece, held control over large parts of the state.

The Albanian communists were afraid that the British troops that had landed in Greece in 1944 could invade Albania proper (Logoreci, 1977:90). More important, members of the Greek minority even took up arms in an effort to promote their cause to the Allies. Hoxha, on the other hand, did not hesitate to support the Greek communists in the Greek Civil War (Xhudo, 1995:117-20).

In the context of the emerging Cold War, the Greek claims vis-à-vis southern Albania (or Northern Epirus) received a favorable ear by the United States, and commissions were set up to inquire into the Greek claims. The end result was Hoxha's policy of isolation from the West, which persisted for several decades.

Greek-Albanian relations improved only after Hoxha's death in 1985 and the collapse of communism in Albania during the 1990s. The two events that have shaped Greek-Albanian relations in the 1990s are the immigration wave of Albanians into Greece and the revitalization of the Greek minority organizations and their entrance into Albanian post-communist political life. The Albanian immigration wave was a reflection of the poor economic conditions in the country. Between 1989 and 1992 Albania's GNP fell by more than 50%, while industrial production declined by 60% and agricultural production by 30% (statistics reported by Biberaj, 1998:188). By mid-1991 Albania had a budget deficit of approximately U.S. $580 million, a balance of payments deficit of U.S. $400 million and a foreign exchange deficit of U.S. $170 million (Xhudo, 1995:125). These poor economic conditions led to a mass immigration wave directed mainly toward Greece (and to lesser extent, Italy). The Greek response to this immigration wave was belated, and it took several years for the Greek authorities to develop a coherent administrative plan to register the immigrants. Initially, the Greek state's reaction was shaped by attempts to provide a preferential treatment for the Greek minority. When in December 1990 the first wave of immigration began, the Greek consulates initiated a policy of providing visas to members of the Greek minority with Orthodox Albanians next and Muslim Albanians last (Vihou et al., 1995:70). The result of this policy was that the overwhelming majority of the labor force from the ranks of the Greek minority ended up in Greece.

Subsequently, the numerical strength of the minority—in terms of the persons actually residing in southern Albania—declined significantly in the 1990s. The main issue that has preoccupied Greek research on the minority concerns the minority's lack of adequate education in communist Albania, as well as the biases in the textbooks used in minority education.

The political mobilization of the Greek minority was made possible only with the collapse of the communist regime in the 1990s. Although Greece and Albania resumed diplomatic relations in 1971, the state of war between the two countries was formally maintained until 1987 (Veremis, 1995a: 35). During the communist regime's rule, the Greek minority was isolated and subjected to harsh repression by the authorities, especially with respect to religious practices. By the mid-1980s the regime's attitude had softened and there was the possibility of relatives visiting their compatriots on the other side of the border. But before discussing the minority issue in the 1990s, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the Albanian political institutions in the 1990s.

The democratization of Albanian society produced two main rivals, the former communist People of Labor Party (PLA or Socialist Party) and the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) led by Sali Berisha. Although the PLA won the first free elections in 1991, the persistent criticism of the opposition eventually led to the DPA winning the 1992 elections with a record 66.7% of the vote. It is important to highlight the degree to which the two parties relied on the preexisting ethnic or tribal loyalties—the Socialists gaining support by the Tosks; the Democrats gaining the support of the Geghs, who had been marginalized and persecuted by the communist regime (Blumi, 1997).

The Berisha government (1992-97), however, suffered from a number of growing pains typical of post-communist Eastern European regimes. (http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=106779085)Throughout the 1990s, unemployment remained around 15% of the active labor population. Moreover, favoritism, fear of outsiders, persecution of the opposition, a tendency to use the government for the party's benefit, and willingness to flirt with extreme nationalism all characterized the regime, which, in this respect, resembled more the post-1989 Russian version of “democracy” than Western democracies. Berisha expelled members of the opposition from the parliament, purged moderate members of his party, and even tried to discredit the PLA by refusing to distribute international food aid in the towns with mayors from the PLA. State security harassed members of the opposition, and PLA members (like Fatos Nano, who later became prime minster) were jailed (Biberaj, 1998:158-61).

The Berisha government instituted privatization policies sponsored by the IMF and World Bank—but whatever economic improvement the people experienced in the 1990s was largely the result of remittances sent back home by the immigrant workers dispersed in Greece, Italy, Germany, and a few other countries. By 1995, the remittances from Albanian immigrants alone accounted for 25% of Albania's GNP. The post-1995 normalization of the status of Greece's illegal Albanian immigrants is likely to help the preservation of this important financial source. The so-called liberalization of the economy led to a variety of economic schemes ranging from money laundering to pyramid-deposit schemes. From 1991 on, approximately twenty “banks” were set up in Albania and were able to attract the investment of numerous Albanians with promises of huge returns (30% to 40%). The socalled investment schemes absorbed close to 1.2 billion U.S. $ or around 50% of the country's GNP (Antonopoulos, 1999:230). In early 1996 new pyramid schemes (Xhaferi and Poppulli) offered 15% to 100% interest to prospective investors for a three-month deposit in such pyramid schemes.

This enticed people to invest and soon the total number of investors reached two million (out of a population of close to 3.5 million). Some of the people involved in these schemes maintained close ties to the DPA, while it is also rumored that the Al-Qaeda also participated in the schemes. The pyramid schemes collapsed in the first half of 1997, triggering widespread riots throughout the country (Emadi, 2000). The country soon plunged into anarchy, and the riots led to close to 2,000 deaths. In the end, the people rose up, took to the streets, and looted the army depots, with thousands of guns ending up in the hands of citizens. Eventually, the Berisha government lost the next elections (1997), and, despite vocal protests, Berisha agreed to assume the post of the opposition leader and step down. Many of the weapons (Kalashnikov automatic guns, grenades, and other small weapons) that people seized during this turbulent period eventually ended up in Kosovo and FYROM.
Following the collapse of the communist regime, the Greek minority was organized in the Omonia (Harmony) party and attempted to compete in the first free elections. The party's organization was the result of mobilization among the minority's intelligentsia with little or no contact with the émigré associations on the other side of the border or any ties to the Greek government. The Ministry of Justice attempted to restrict parties that organized themselves according to an “ethnic” basis (Vihou et al., 1995:63-70), but Omonia was successful in electing five deputies to the new Albanian Parliament. Following this electoral success a law was passed barring the formation of parties based on ethnicity. Soon afterwards, however, the more nationalistic-oriented individuals of the minority, assisted by Greek émigré organizations, set up the Movement of Human Rights. This party was formulated on an explicitly non-ethnic basis, thereby making it eligible to participate in the 1992 nationwide elections. Despite some problems, the party was able to participate in that year's elections, and its performance registered the dispersion of the Greek minority throughout Albania (including those regions not recognized as “minority zones” by the Albanian government).

In addition to the issue of the Greek minority's political participation, Greek-Albanian relations in the 1990s were also influenced by the post-communist reorganization of the Albanian Orthodox Church. The church suffered extensively during the communist regime, and in the course of the official persecution of its personnel many priests and bishops died (including Archbishop Chistophoros in 1958). The 1950 Church Constitution was abolished with the 4,337 decree dated 13 November 1967 (Georgoulis, 1995:154-55). This abolition was reiterated and strengthened during the 5th Congress of the Albanian Communist Party and officially sanctioned with the 1976 constitution that declared Albania to be an atheist state. Therefore, following the collapse of the communist regime, the Orthodox Church had to begin rebuilding its institutional structure from ground zero. In the 1990-92 period, because of lack of an approved constitution, the church operated solely on the basis of its canons. On 24 July 1992 the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Istanbul) elected Anastasios—a Greek citizen—as the new head of the Albanian Church and ordered that no other church organization (including the U.S.-based Albanian Orthodox Church) had jurisdiction on Albanian soil (Georgoulis, 1995:155). The church reorganization triggered protests by the U.S.-based Albanian Orthodox Church, which lost the opportunity to extend its influence into the home country.

akritas
02-18-2006, 02:27 PM
On 25 June 1993, the Albanian authorities deported Archimandrite Chrysostomos Maidonis, a Greek clergyman working with the Orthodox archbishop, to Greece on grounds of his alleged “nationalist propaganda” against the Albanian state. President Berisha also declared that only Albanian nationals should occupy posts with the Albanian Orthodox Church, thereby raising the possibility that the archbishop himself (who is a Greek citizen) might be deported as well. In this context, it is important to note that the boundaries differentiating Orthodox Albanians from Greeks are unclear. Many members of the Greek minority have only an elementary knowledge of Greek and look to the Orthodox Church as the basic cultural marker for their own cultural differentiation from the rest of the population. Hence, an emphasis on the “Greek” character of the Albanian Orthodox Church can be seen as an attempt to “acculturate” members of the Albanian Orthodox community into Hellenism. The deportation was accompanied by protests by the Greek minority and clashes between the Albanian police and the demonstrators (Antonopoulos, 1999:129). The minority rallied behind the archbishop, whereas the Albanian authorities treated the situation as a nationalist provocation. On the other side of the border, the Greek authorities were quick to react.

In the days following the Archmandrite's deportation, some 5,000 Albanians were deported to Albania. Given the inadequate control of the border, there was little doubt that most of them would be back within a few days, but the purpose of these actions was to “remind” Albania of its financial dependence on the income coming from Albanian workers in Greece. In an interview in the Greek journal Economic Review (19 August 1993), Greek Premier Costantinos Mitsotakis made clear that Albania could not afford to react to the deportations of Albanians from Greece since its weak economy made the state dependent upon the remittance of Albanians from Greece. In the aftermath of this affair, Mitsotakis declared that the status of the Greek minority in southern Albania (or Northern Epirus) should be equated with that of the Albanian population in Kosovo, and if autonomy was given to them, then the same should apply to the Greeks in Albania. The post-1993 socialist governments abandoned this approach, and relations between the two states have improved.

However, another round of political confrontation was initiated on 10 April 1994, when an Albanian military post near the Greek border was attacked and unidentified armed men killed two soldiers. The Albanians blamed the attack on the extremist “Northern Epirus Liberation Front” (Metopo Apeleutheroseos Voreiou Ipirou, or MAVI) and argued that the Front had received assistance by minority members and the Greek Special Forces. The Albanians' suspicions were confirmed when, in 1995, Greek authorities discovered and successfully prosecuted the members of MAVI (Antonopoulos, 1999:159). However, the Albanian president, Berisha, did not hesitate to accuse Greece of “state terrorism” and to suggest a parallel between Athens and Belgrade in terms of their regional policy (quoted in Biberaj, 1998:243). Berisha's charges that Greece had “expansionist goals” led to the Albanian police investigating and eventually arresting five members of the Greek community, who were accused of having assisted in the attack. The Albanian authorities charged these five former members of the Omonia group with plotting an armed insurrection against the Albanian government. All of them were found guilty in a kangaroo trial that caused protests by international associations (Papoudakis, 1996). Within months of their imprisonment, however, economic and diplomatic pressure from Greece led to their release.

As this brief overview suggests, Greek-Albanian relations remained precarious throughout the 1990s. Minor incidents or police matters frequently led to political confrontations between the two sides. However, it is important to highlight the extent to which the Greek and Albanian economies have grown interdependent, and eventually this factor prevents the recurrent disputes from becoming major obstacles in interstate relations. For example, Greek exports to Albania increased from $12.2 million in 1991 to $221 million in 1994 (Giannaris, 1996:58). Moreover, the Greek state instituted in 1997 a green card program that allowed the majority of illegal immigrants to register, thereby making it possible for them to stay in the country legally and work without fear of prosecution. According to the latest reports of the Greek Unemployment Agency (OAED), the total number of people who registered with the green card program is close to 800,000, and authorities estimate that close to 75% of them are Albanian immigrants (reported in the newspaper Ethnos, 16 August 2001).

In the long run, economics has solved the Greek minority issue in southern Albania. Given the large difference in the standards of living between the two countries, it is unlikely that most of the Greek minority who immigrated into Greeece in the 1990s will be moving back to their original homes in the near future. On the contrary, it is far more likely that both ethnic Albanian immigrants as well as minority immigrants will choose to remain in Greece. In this respect, the relations between the two states are greatly influenced by the discrimination against the Albanian immigrants by Greeks and the subsequent resentment Albanians feel against Greeks. The unstable geopolitical situation of the 1990s (involving Kosovo and FYROM) further complicated matters. Still, the successful incorporation and inclusion of the Albanian immigrants by Greece should aid significantly in the development of better relations between Athens and Tirana. Currently, this is perhaps the most important challenge facing the two countries.

The extent to which the state and the broader Greek society succeed in dealing with this challenge will determine the long-term relations between Athens and Tirana, as well as the economic development of the two countries. In 2000 and 2001, Greek conservative critics have campaigned against various forms of Albanian incorporation into Greek society—and it is important that the Greek state stays the course with regard to its policy of inclusion. For example, Albanian students have enrolled in Greek schools, and some of them have received honors, thereby becoming eligible for participating in the school parades during the Greek national holidays and carrying the Greek flag. Conservative Greek critics consider such activities to be inappropriate, thereby provoking a fierce debate on the Albanian immigrants' future incorporation into twenty-first century Greek society.

source :
Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict by by Victor Roudometof; Praeger, 2002

akritas
10-02-2006, 07:10 AM
Below is a document from the C.M. Woodhouse when served as British Liaison officer in Greece at the 40s. In my opinion the description that give as about the Chams issue is very accurate. The pic came from the book of Eleftherias Mantas with title ....Oi Mousoulmanoi Tsamedes ths Epirou(1923-200),IMXA,2004.....

http://img226.imageshack.us/img226/2756/scan10060tb3.jpg

HellenicPride
10-21-2006, 08:06 AM
Great find Akritas , this should definately shed some light.

Flipper
12-01-2006, 04:59 AM
So, some nationalist Albanians are stepping up the Chameria question. The Chams are mentioned to be the ancient inhabitants of Chameria while the historian community accepts that the area was the Kindom of the Molossians, one of the strongest Hellenic tribes.

So, what sources do the Albanians use to support this. I mean no ancient source connects the Molossians with Illyrians. The Molossians declered themselves as ancestors of Neoptolemeos and we know that they didn't want anything to do with Illyrians. Besides their land suffered from Illyrian attacks.

On the other side milder form of Albanian sites mention them as a Hellenic Kindom with many Illyrian citizens. Others do not even include them as a part of Albanian history.

Eather way, Ptolemy told me once that in 1 to 2 years we will have a front from that side. We should start collecting data and prepare a similar site before the big bang.

akritas
12-01-2006, 05:07 AM
Ελευθερία Μαντά, Οι μουσουλμάνοι Τσάμηδες της Ηπείρου (1923-2000), Θεσσαλονίκη 2004.

http://www.imxa.gr/photos/book_muslims.gif

The above book is the most recent regarding the issue and the most reliable regarding the poltical and historical facts.There are plenty of scanning documents.I suggested anepefilahta

Flipper
12-01-2006, 05:44 AM
Thanks Akritas!

Does it have information about the Chams Tsiflikades? I've always heard from the Epirots about how their ancestors had to work like slaves in their formerly own farms and how their revolts were drained in blood because of the Chams close cooperation with the Turks. It is supposed to be the main reason why Epirots in Greece and Albania have such a hate for them.

The irony is how the Chams say they want their property back. A property which they gained with "roufiania" like we say...

akritas
12-01-2006, 06:20 AM
No Flip, she focus in the period of 1920s and after.Actually the Chams issue started in 19123 wheduring the negotiations which led to the signing of the Greek-Turkish Exchange of Population Convention, Greece declared to the sub-committee on the exchangethat had no intention of excahnging Moslems of Albanian origin.You will read how Albanian government reacted and generally or the historical-political course until 2000.

Also read this thread ?

http://www.macedoniaontheweb.com/forum/epirus-forum/384-chams-question.html

because I will merge both in a couple hours:) Are Similar

Ptolemy
12-01-2006, 06:27 AM
Eather way, Ptolemy told me once that in 1 to 2 years we will have a front from that side. We should start collecting data and prepare a similar site before the big bang.

Actually it has already began but in a few years it will be a huge problem. Thats why i told nsminc to register domains bearing this name from now. We should do the same with domains related to Thrace.

Illyria
02-25-2007, 02:02 PM
How come we albanians use the term "Cameria" which is even older than Epirus for this region if we came as late the mediaeval era? We sure didnt get it from the greeks since greeks and even greek epirotes never use this term,they only use Thesprotia and Hpeiros etc. Cameria or Tchyameria comes from the old river of Tchyamis (kallama) and later it was used by albanians for the entire region.

?

olvios
02-25-2007, 02:07 PM
How come you dont read any historical sources and deny to use your logic and reason to come to conclusions?

Illyria
02-25-2007, 02:17 PM
How come you dont read any historical sources and deny to use your logic and reason to come to conclusions?



were can i see you sources???

olvios
02-25-2007, 02:21 PM
Read the previous posts of the thread.In every topic in every thread you posted you cling to your arbitrary views.

Illyria
02-25-2007, 03:23 PM
"Arha Ellas apo Oricias kai arhegonos Ellas Epiros"

"Greece starts at Oricus and the most ancient part of Greece is Epirus."

Claudius Ptolemy, The Geographer

Hundreds of literary and archaelogical evidence exist but you choose to ignore everything.You can leave the forum go learn english and go get a course on the use of logic to deduct conclusions.Then return and teach your people.



answer the question


How come we albanians use the term "Cameria" which is even older than Epirus for this region if we came as late the mediaeval era? We sure didnt get it from the greeks since greeks and even greek epirotes never use this term,they only use Thesprotia and Hpeiros etc. Cameria or Tchyameria comes from the old river of Tchyamis (kallama) and later it was used by albanians for the entire region.

olvios
02-25-2007, 03:30 PM
Its not older , epirus is older .I answered.The issue is stupidly used by your country (to noeffect at all) to fuel your pointlees nationalism.Who cares what you call Epirus?only you.

olvios
02-25-2007, 03:32 PM
You think all the ancients lied to harm the "Albanian Divine mighty nation" what a joke.

olvios
02-25-2007, 03:52 PM
Stay on the Chams issue we have too many subjects opened.

akritas
02-25-2007, 03:59 PM
answer the question


How come we albanians use the term "Cameria" which is even older than Epirus for this region if we came as late the mediaeval era? We sure didnt get it from the greeks since greeks and even greek epirotes never use this term,they only use Thesprotia and Hpeiros etc. Cameria or Tchyameria comes from the old river of Tchyamis (kallama) and later it was used by albanians for the entire region.
The word of the river is Thyamis and not Tchyamis.
Your language can prounounce the suffix Th?:)